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Tort and Insurance Law:
How Times Have Changed!
James D. Ghiardi
On reaching the half-century
mark, it behooves the Tort and Insur-
ance Practice Section to briefly review
the trends in tort and insurance law
between 1933 and 1983. Legal histori-
ans will someday record the develop-
ments in full, considering all of the
nuances and forces that brought them
about. The goal of this article is to
highlight some of those changes, fac-
tors and developments.
Early tort law was primarily domi-
nated by the concept of liability, and
not until the late 19th century did the
fault concept come into focus with the
development of the negligence action
as a basis for the expansion of tort
liability.' Thus, tort law developed
along two lines: (1) That a person acted
at his peril and was strictly liable for
injuries which his action caused; and
(2) That a person should be held liable
only for fault or antisocial conduct.
In 1933, the negligence, or fault,
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concept was predominant. Traffic
and transportation accidents ac-
counted for a large proportion of the
civil damage suits brought in Ameri-
can courts.2 However, at the same
time strict liability principles were
starting to be recognized in the aclop-
tion of workers' compensation statutes
and by legal rules relating to trespass
to land, ultrahazardous activities,
carrier's liability for transported
goods and respondeat superior. The
seed for the erosion of the fault aspect
of negligence also was growing with the
expansion of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, the disappearance of immu-
nities and the attacks on the common
law doctrines of contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk and last clear
chance.
But the trend toward acceptance of
the liability concept was only one of
the factors beginning to alter tort and
insurance law in the early 1930s. A
variety of other factors also have con-
tributed to the evolution of today's
tort and insurance law.
Professional organizations
Prior to tile creation in 1933 of
TIPS, then known as the ABA's Insur-
ance Law Section, only one national
legal organization emphasized tort
and insurance law: the International
Association of Insurance Counsel.
The IAIC was an organization of law-
yers specializing in the defense of tort
and insurance claims. The Insurance
Law Section was formed by the ABA
as a national organization designed to
bring together all lawyers interested in
tort, insurance and compensation
law. Later, the Federation of Insur-
ance Counsel and the Association of
Insurance Attorneys, both primarily
interested in the defense of tort and in-
surance claims, were formed. The
claimant's, or plaintiffs, bar was or-
ganized in 19,16 as the National Asso-
ciation of Claimants Counsel of
America (later Association of Trial
Lawyers of America) for the purpose
of "providing strong, competent and
vigorous representation to the injured
victims of society. '" In 1961, tie
Defense Research Institute was orga-
nized for the purpose of bringing those
interested in defending tort and insur.
ance claims under one umbrella. 4
The impact on the development of
tort and insurance law by these groups
has been tremendous.
Judicial activism
Traditionally, judges were con-
cerned with precedent and the con-
cept of stare decisis. Changes were
made slowly but steadily as new fac-
tual situations were presented to the
courts. But in recent years, judicial
activism has become more prevalent
ancl the courts have moved more rap-
idly than legislatures in developing
new tort and insurance concepts."
The trends in courts have been:
(I) The examination and revision of
rules of law which are claimed to have
outlived their usefulness; and (2) The
enunciation of new principles of re-
sponsibility which have imposed lia-
bilities in areas previously exempt. 7
Thus, the activism of the courts and
the competency of the claimant's bar
have played major roles in the expan-
sion of the concept of liability rather
than fault, the promulgation of new
causes of action and tile elimination of
traditional immunities and defenses.
Liability insurance
With the end of World War 11 and
the passage of the McCarran Act," at-
tention focused on the liability insur-
ance business. Changes in the ways of
doing business and enlightened regu-
lation by state insurance departments
resulted in an increased insurance
capacity and an expansion of risks
covered by liability insurance.
One illustration was the packaging
of insurance policies to sell various
risks such as property, medical and
liability together. As a result, every
homeowner acquiredl liability cover-
age along with his fire insurance
coverage. Automobile operators were
able to obtain sufficient and inexpen-
sive liability insurance, and businesses
were insured against loss resulting
from their operations and activities.
6 
Thus, parties injured in the home.
at work, on the highway or in public
places were more abw to find a viable
and solvent source for compensation.
The aim of tort law has always been in-
iemnity and deterrence, and with tile
expansion of the capacity of liability
insurers, the chances for indemnity
became greater and, therefore, the
types and nature of claims that were
being brought to fruition expanded.'
Procedure and evidence
Tort procedural rules have come a
long way from the traditional writs of
trespass and trespass on the case to
what has been termed by some as
"post-card plealing."
The rules of evidence have been
liberalized to the point where the par-
ties can more easily meet their burden
of proof. The adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975 was but a
culmination of the liberalizing devel-
opments in the field. l0 The expansion
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
application of less rigid rules of civil
procedure and the adoption by most
states of the Federal Rules of Evidence
led to broader discovery procedures
and the expanded use of experts.
These evidentiary and procedural
rules plus the extension of class actions
gave impetus to a litigation explosion
originally fueled by automobile and
later by product liability and profes.
sional malpractice claims.
No-fault auto insurance
With the expansion of tort liability
and increased litigation, it was inevit-
able that the advocacy system of liti-
gating tort and insurance cases would
be subject to attack. Dissatisfaction
with delays, expense, uncertainty of
result, "liberal" judges, contingent
fees, claim practices, insurance costs
and availability and the jury system
culminated in the 1960s with pro-
posals to adopt no-fault principles in
the auto insurance field."I
In the mid-60s, the Keeton-O'Con-
nell basic protection plan for automo-
bile insurance was proposed. 12 This
led to a wave of activity by various
groups.
In 1969, the ABA louse of Dele-
gates adopted the "Report of the Spe-
cial Committee on Automobile Acci-
dent Reparations," known as tile
"Powers Report. '"'" The repoit ad-
(tressed tile problems of delay, cost
and efficiency, It recommended
change in substantive and procedural
tort law and expressel opposition to a
federal automobile no-fault law. De-
spite attempts at passage, a proposel
federal no-fault law was defeated.
But from 1970 to 1973, 19 states
and Puerto Rico adopted some form
of automobile no-fault insurance.14
The impact of this legislation has been
varied from state to state. Changes in
the guest laws. settlement practices,
tile adoption of comparative negli-
gence and uninsured motorist cover-
age have reduced automobile acci-
dent litigation in the states that have
not adopted no-fault statutes.
Since 1975 there has been very little
impetus for the enactment of no-fault
legislation at either the federal or state
level. Although auto accidents con-
tinue unabated, the trial of these cases
is no longer consideredt a major policy
problem despite the losses being in-
curred by auto insurers.
Comparative negligence
The no-fault controversy probably
had its greatest impact in the fact
that, for the first time, the ABA ad-
vocated adoption of a comparative
negligence system."0 At the time the
controversy arose, six states had some
form of comparative negligence while
elsewhere contributory negligence
continued as a total defense. From
these humble beginnings, 39 jurisdic-
tions now have some form of com-
parative negligence; 11 have adopted
a pure form, 25 a modified form and
three a varied type of comparative
law, 6
Damages
Tort law in the early 19th century
called for a strict construction of the
evidence for the recovery of compen-
satory damages. The concept of gen-
eral damages for pain, suffering or
embarrassment was, although recog-
nized, limited. Today, however, proof
techniques, the availability of expert
witnesses and a general recognition
that pain and suffering, embarrass-
ment, fright and emotional trauma
are compensable items have led to
large awards for emotional distress,
loss of consortium and other more
ephemeral forms of harm.
The last decade has seen a liberali-
zation in the ability to recover for the
negligent causing of emotional dis-
tress with the removal of the impact
requirement. Although most jurisdic-
tions still require proof of physical in-
jury, morecourts are beginning to em-
phasize the reliability of tile proof of
harm rather than rigidly requiring
physical injury.' 7
Punitive damages, recognized in all
but four jurisdictions, have continued
to expand and develop"' as a result of
judicial recognition that compen-
satory damages may not always com-
pensate a plaintiff or deter the wrong-
doer. Claimant counsel have honed
their ability to prove aggravatel con-
duct to allow for punitive damages in
more and more situations. Courts to-
lay are about evenly split on the issue
of whether liability insurance covers
punitive damages and on whether
such coverage should be held to be
against the public policy of the state. 19
Early wrongful death statutes,
which created a cause of action on
behalf of the decedent's survivors,
limited recovery to economic loss.
Most statutes did not allow recovery
for loss of society and companionship.
The past two decades have seen the
removal of any limitation on the
amount recoverable for economic loss
and more jurisdictions are allowing
recovery for loss of society and com-
panionship in an action for wrongful
death .21
The fastest growing new concept in
the tort damage area is the use of
structured settlements. This concept's
use of periodic payments has been
fostered by favorable tax rulings, a
lessening of opposition by plaintiff
counsel, competitive activity among
the annuity specialists, and a recogni-
tion that structured settlements bene-
fit both claimants and defendants. 2'
Product liability
The most dramatic development in
tort law in recent decades has been the
so-called product liability "revolution."
Product liability is not new. Its ex-
pansion began with the removal of
privity requirements in negligence ac-
tions. However, it mushroomed in the
late 1960s when recovery was recog-
nized or a "strict liability" theory based
on a ferm of "warranty created by law"
,-,J, ultimately, Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 12
Every attorney is aware of the in-
crease in product liability suits based
on the duty to construct, test, warn
and design products safely for use by
the consumer. Every product seller is
now more readily exposed to liability
if for some reason a product causes
harm to an individual. Nuances of
product liability law are well known,
but the growth and impact of product
claims continue to ripple across our
land. This is dramatically illustrated
by the DES cases, asbestosis and other
"trauma," or "toxic," torts.
2 3
Congressional concern about prod-
uct liability is illustrated by the adop-
tion of the Consumer Product Safety
Act 24 and the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act, 2 as well as proposed
Senate Bill 44 .26 Legislative reform in
the states also continues.
27
Individual liability has been ex-
pandetl in certain types of product
liability cases. The Sindell decision2 8
adopted a so-called enterprise liability
theory in the DES cases, which shifted
the burden of proof for the defen-
clant's causal conduct from the plain-
tiff to the defendant. By applying this
concept, an entire industry can be
charged with liability although indi-
vidual members of the industry have
not been proven to be either at fault or




With courts increasingly empha-
sizing consumer protection, it was in-
evitable that the professions would be
scrutinized to determine whether
their failures to perform their respon-
sibilities as professionals should give
rise to tort liability.
Medical malpractice had long been
a fertile field for tort liability since the
harm resulting from the failure of a
health care provider to perform its
duty resulted in a direct loss to the in-
dividual. Liability had been ham-
pered by statutesof limitation and the
locality rule. Assault on the locality
rule and changes in the limitation
periods gave impetus to an increased
number of medical malpractice
claims. Coupled with the adoption of
the informed consent concept, a
"crisis" arose in the medical malprac-
tice field in the early 1970s.3 0 This
fostered federal and state studies and
a plethora of state reform legisla-
tion. 3' As a result, in many jurisdic-
tions medical malpractice actions now
must be submitted first to a panel type
of proceeding before they can be
brought to court. With the adoption
of the panel proceeding and an expan-
sion of the capacity of insurers to
handle medical malpractice claims,
some balance has been restored. How-
ever, trends indicate that the solutioa
may be only a temporary one. 32
Needless to say, attorneys, accoun-
tants, architects, engineers, insurance
agents, real estate brokers, and other
professionals have not been exempted
from these developments. 3'3
New causes of action
There have been numerous devel-
opments in traditional areas of tort
litigation and emerging causes of ac-
tion in recent years:
a Pollution, toxic waste and the
desire to protect the environment,
coupled with the more generous use of
class actions, have led to more litiga-
tion. Federal legislation has provided
a realistic basis for success by
claimants adversely affected by abuses
of the environment .
4
0 Civil rights actions have been
fostered by the expanded interpreta-
tion of Sections 1982 and 1983 of Title
42 of the U.S. Code.'-1 More claimants
are seeking individual relief from civil
rights violators in the form of tort ac-
tions for damages.
0 Defamation actions are on the in-
crease, aided by the Supreme Court's
decisions in New York Times v. Sulli-
van,
36 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 31
and their progeny. As a result, indi-
viduals now have an easier and clearer
basis for libel and slander actions.
The future
The increased use of chemicals, ad-
ditives, preservatives and nonnatural
materials in our society will lead to
more trauma torts similar to those re-
suiting from the use of Agent Orange
by th- federal government and pesti-
(Continued on page 39)
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cides by farmers and production of
chemical wastes by manufacturers.
Liberalization of proof requirements
in the damage area, the use of struc-
tured settlements, more liberal use of
releases, expansion of principles of
comparative contribution, indemnity
and subrogation are just around the
corner. New causes of action for
wrongful life, wrongful death and ex-
panded liability in the aviation field
and in the use of homeowner warran-
ties will fuel tort litigation growth.
Mounting criticism
However, what all lawyers must
ponder is the criticism of the tort
liability system that has been steadily
mounting for years, reaching a fever
pitch in the last five years. The entire
method of resolving tort disputes is the
issue of the 1980s:
The end of the adversary system may be at
hand unless the legal profession takes the
initiative and sees to it that a judicial
system is developed which can adequately
handle this multitude of cases and provide
for the needs of the ordinary citizen, all at
a reasonable cost and in an expeditious
manner."
One knowledgeable writer has stated,
"What may be the most important
tort trend in a generation is the recog-
nition of the crisis that now exists in
the administration of justice.""
Reforms to enhance the legal pro-
fession and preserve the adversary sys-
tem command the active support and
participation of lawyers, judges, legal
educators and the public. Trial
counsel must recognize that they owe a
duty not only to advise and represent
clients, but also to bring about justice
and fair play in an expedited and
economical manner. TIPS as a section
must face this challenge and play a
greater role in its solution as it enters
the second half-century of its ex-
istence.
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